The Rapiscan full-body scanner removal from US airports, completed by June 2013, followed a procurement that cost the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) $40,077,571 for 251 units, funded through American Recovery and Reinvestment Act money, according to the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. The scanners, which rendered passengers effectively nude on screeners’ monitors, were gone within four years of deployment, replaced by technology that displays only a generic human avatar.
The chain of events began around Christmas 2009, when an individual attempted to smuggle explosives concealed in his underwear on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. No explosion resulted, but the security failure sent shockwaves through border agencies on both sides of the Atlantic. The US and the UK moved quickly to deploy full-body imaging technology capable of detecting non-metallic threats hidden beneath clothing.
A $40 Million Investment That Could Not Survive Its Privacy Problem
Between 2009 and 2010, the TSA purchased 251 Secure 1000SP advanced imaging technology units from Rapiscan Systems, drawing on American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds for the $40,077,571 procurement. Thirty US airports installed a total of 174 of these scanners, and the ten largest airports in the UK received the same machines. At $180,000 per unit, the investment reflected the urgency felt by security agencies at the time.
The core problem was immediately apparent to anyone who saw the output: the Rapiscan full-body scanner displayed complete anatomical detail. TSA agents and passengers who became aware of this were horrified. The backlash was not limited to public discomfort. In July 2010, the Electronic Privacy Information Center sued the TSA, arguing that the scanners violated privacy laws and that the imagery was equivalent to a, in their words, ‘physically invasive strip search’, according to NPR.
The TSA had anticipated the privacy objections. In August 2010, it ordered automatic target recognition (ATR) software from Rapiscan for all 251 Secure 1000SP units, with testing beginning in October 2010, the DHS Inspector General records show. ATR software was intended to replace the anatomical image with a generic outline, flagging only the area of concern rather than exposing the passenger’s body to a screener. Rapiscan gave Congress a commitment to deliver the software update across the fleet.
The company was unable to meet that congressionally mandated deadline. With no compliant privacy software in place, the TSA had no viable path to keeping the machines in service. By June 2013, the Rapiscan full-body scanner had been phased out entirely from US airports.
What Replaced the Rapiscan Units and Where Scanning Stands Today
The replacement technology came from L-3 Communications, whose millimeter wave scanners use ATR software to show a standardised human avatar on screen. Where the system detects a potential concealed item, it highlights the general area on that avatar rather than producing any anatomical image. Individual TSA agents then assess whether a physical search is needed. The newer machines do not image inside the body: items such as medical implants or internal devices are not visible.
A common misconception persists that modern airport scanners can see inside a passenger’s body. They image to skin level only, flagging metallic and non-metallic objects on the exterior of the body for agent review.
Looking ahead, both the US and the UK are rolling out Next Generation Security Checkpoints (NGSC), which use advanced three-dimensional baggage scanning. NGSC equipment allows passengers to leave liquids and electronics inside bags during screening, reducing the time each lane takes to process. UK airports are also working toward scrapping the 100ml liquid limit for hand luggage once NGSC scanners are installed across the network. In the US, facial recognition is in use at around 200 airports, matching biometric data against the digital REAL ID now required for domestic air travel.
The DHS Inspector General’s 2014 review of the Rapiscan procurement remains the most detailed official account of what the programme cost and why the units were ultimately withdrawn, with the failure to deliver functional ATR software on schedule cited as the direct cause of the phase-out.
